The southern Americas are home to 481,000,000 people, including some half-million Jews.
CHAPTER 11

Jews and Non-Jews

"Buenos Aires, shtot mein liebe, Ich bin farlibt in dein tsedlitzer yugnt..."
(Buenos Aires, beloved city, I'm in love with your flowering youth....)

—Yiddish version of a Carlos Gardel tango

For many Latin Americans, the reality of Jewish life is obscured by mythology. Only the dissipation of myth allows the reality of Jews and Judaism to appear. Apparently, this happens more readily at the personal than at the societal level. The acceptability of Jews as marriage partners is widespread, causing Jewish leaders to express more concern about assimilation than about anti-Semitism. Yet happy exogamous marriages exist side by side with murderous manifestations of race hatred.

Within Jewish spaces, behind the symbolic walls of the kehillah, highly organized Jewish communities regulate the behavior of their members by excluding the intermarried, the criminal, and the politically radical. The politically correct clubs and synagogues and beneficent societies that result present to non-Jews the appearance of a people unified in character and goals. But the suave facade of country club life masks the abandonment of Judaism by those who do not find ethnic allegiance compelling, as well as the emigration of others who desire to live a less circumscribed life as Jews. The number of Argentines who identify themselves as Jews has dropped by one-third in the past thirty years; across the continent, total numbers have decreased in this period from 550,000 to 377,000.

In public spaces, Latino Jewish entrepreneurs, academics, artists, and literati have experienced increasing success. As third and fourth generations acculturate, the social acceptability of Jews increases. In recent years, this has translated into wider acceptance of political participation by Jewish individuals. But acculturation has not diminished the hostility directed at Jews by sectors of the military and the church, which emerges in extreme forms when these sectors attain political dominance.

No wonder then that the texture of relations between Jews and non-Jews
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in Latin America continues to puzzle observers. Dichotomies of attraction and repulsion, marginalization and integration, assimilation and particularism, anti-Semitism and philo-Semitism animate the literature on Latin American Jewry. Conclusions that may be valid for one country may rightly be challenged if applied to another. Argentina is not Brazil is not Nicaragua. This chapter attempts to interpret the nature of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews in Latin America. Because the largest Jewish population is to be found in Argentina and this community has been the most intensively studied, attention is first focused there.

Argentina: Attraction and Repulsion

The most obdurate anti-Semitism is that which derives from the conviction that Judaism is a worldwide conspiracy aimed at destroying Christianity and subjecting the world to domination by Jews.1 This belief is central to Argentine nacionalismo, and it is practically impervious to reality-based evidence. At most, nationalists may harbor a difference of opinion as to whether the propensity to subversion is diluted by distance from the Jewish people and Judaism through intermarriage and assimilation. For populistas, assimilation renders Jews acceptable. For integralistas, however, once a Jew, always a Jew, even if formal conversion has taken place. Both brands of nationalists reject the liberal philosophy that brought non-Catholics and non-Latinos to Argentine shores, and both reject the multicultural society that is emerging from the immigration period. Their ideal is an organic society overseen by a corporative state, and Jews, the ultimate nonconformists, are the special target of their hostility.2 Despite the persistence of extreme anti-Semitic beliefs, it has been said that Argentina as a nation never adopted an anti-Semitic policy.

It is clear that, with the exception of laws and policies concerning immigration, there has not been a systematic legislative effort to discriminate against Jews in Argentina. But it is also worth noting that there was often room in the interstices of legislation for the administrative expression of anti-Semitism. For much of the period discussed (1930–83) Jews were effectively excluded from certain areas of official life. For example, there was not a single Jew in the middle or upper officer ranks, although both Chile and Brazil had Jewish generals. The foreign service was also essentially closed to Jews. During the tenure of the military regime of 1943, many Jewish teachers were dismissed from their jobs. Under the military governments of 1966 and 1976 a great many Jews were removed from the civil service posts and university positions they had acquired when the democratically elected Radicals were in power.3

Avni argues that the closest Argentina has come to adoption of an anti-Semitic policy was when it refused to admit Jewish refugees from Nazism. Catholic religious instruction in the public schools has been another sensitive
area; while not explicitly anti-Semitic, it has allowed for the transmission of
anti-Semitic ideas. Local legislation outlawing kosher slaughter or restricting
the public use of the Yiddish language also shaped the Argentine Jewish experience,
although some of these measures were transitory.

It may be that discrimination, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.
Perhaps Argentine Jews, like Mao Zedong's allegorical fish who do not know
what water is, are so acclimated to high levels of free-floating anti-Semitism
that they accept it as the natural order of things. As individuals and as a group,
they accept limitations and discriminations that appear outrageous to North
Americans as the cost of living in a Catholic society that partially excludes
them, yet exerts a sweet charm over them. The romanticized story of the
agricultural colonies has rooted them in the very earth of Argentina. Those
who came to the city were mostly able to attain a satisfactory way of life.
Criollo ways—the close-knit family ties, the intense intellectual life of cafés
and bookstores, the streets and restaurants filled with throngs of people until
well past midnight—contrast delightfully with dark memories of the old country
or more recent impressions of chilly northern climes. There seemed to be no
reason why life should not continue to unfold pleasantly into the indefinite
future.

This dream began to crumble in the fifties and sixties during the administra­
tions of two democratically elected presidents. It is part of the Argentine
paradox that the viability of Jewish life in that country was brought seriously
into question during the constitutional administrations of Presidents Arturo
Frondizi (1958–62) and Arturo Illia (1963–66). Within the context of an
ongoing economic crisis and tension between civilian and military forces, anti­
Semitic verbal and physical attacks escalated. Anti-Jewish graffiti appeared on
city walls and attacks on Jewish businesses and institutions were carried out
by right-wing groups, without eliciting a police response or even official ac­
knowledgment of the incidents. Out of a long catalogue of anti-Semitic actions,
Senkman lists some examples from the period 1959–62.

Beginning in 1959, propaganda fliers and anti-Semitic graffiti scrawled on
the walls of Jewish institutions in Buenos Aires encouraged violent attacks on
Jews. In March, students at Colegio del Salvador, while protesting a change
in the national constitution, incidentally took up an anti-Semitic chant. In
April, the Sociedad Hebraica Argentina was violently attacked. In May, a gang
confronted Jewish children in Villa Devoto on their way to a Zionist festival.
Synagogues in the city of La Plata and the province of Córdoba were attacked.
In July, a bomb exploded in front of Congregación Israelita de la República
Argentina in the center of Buenos Aires. In August, armed men entered the
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires and
destroyed stands that had been put up for an exhibition by Hebrew University.
In August and September, additional attacks occurred against Jewish institu­
tions: October witnessed attacks against Jewish youth centers in Córdoba,
Paraná, and La Plata; and in December the patios of the Faculty of Economics
at UBA were painted with swastikas and anti-Jewish slogans. Throughout
December and the following January, anti-Jewish inscriptions appeared all over the country, cemeteries were desecrated, and Jewish businesses were painted with swastikas, especially in La Plata and Córdoba. Threatening phone calls to members of the Jewish community heightened the tension. When school resumed, there were more attacks against Jewish students at Colegio Nacional Sarmiento.

In this atmosphere, the abduction of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents triggered an organized campaign of attacks on Argentine Jews by the political faction Unión Cívica Nacionalista and the neo-Nazi group Tacuara, on the pretext that national sovereignty was in danger. The pot boiled over with the national debate over the reintroduction of Catholic instruction in the schools. In this debate, the priest Julio Meinvielle found his métier, reissuing his anti-Semitic book, El judio en el misterio de la historia (The Jew in the Mystery of History). An uninterrupted fusillade of anti-Semitic attacks by UCN and Tacuara in anticipation of elections culminated in June 1962 with the kidnapping of a young Jewish woman, who was forcibly tattooed with a swastika on her breast. Neo-Nazis disrupted colleges and universities all over the country upon Israel's execution of Eichmann.

Attacks on Jewish individuals and institutions met with no official objection and were carried out with impunity. In some instances, police refused to accept victims' complaints and denied to the press that any attack had taken place. Anti-Semitic acts were dismissed as staged events for the purpose of covering up "Jewish economic crimes." The DAIA, which made representations to the police and to presidential aides, was accused of falsifying incidents in order to foment a communist plot.

Meanwhile, the army, which held the civilian government in checkmate, "obsessed with radical or leftist conspiracies," confused working-class action, such as union-based or peronista politics, with its chief enemy, communism. Senkman's explanation for the failure of these transitional democratic regimes to act (they were bracketed and displaced by military coups) is that both Frondizi and Illia were primarily interested in neutralizing social and political unrest. Because neo-Nazis and right-wing goons were battling the threat from the left, they chose to ignore their attacks on Jews. At the same time, these democratically elected presidents failed to assess the damage being done to the social fabric by the license being allowed to the right wing to carry out criminal acts against the civil population; the intensive focus of government and military on stopping the advance of peronism and communism conditioned them to excuse the "excesses" of gangs who included anti-Semitism in their anti-communist arsenal. The strident propaganda pouring out of a variety of presses at this time, and the closing of Jewish leftist institutions while groups inspired by Nazi ideology continued to operate freely, prepared the public to believe in the existence of a "Jewish communist plot." Strong feelings of insecurity permeated the Jewish community, most of whose members had voted for the Radical party that now was presiding over their deteriorating position.

The leaders of DAIA nevertheless continued to support democratic forces.
They reasoned that anti-Semitism was being used as a political weapon by reactionary forces seeking to destabilize democracy in the interest of a return to authoritarian government, and that both Frondizi and Illia failed to see the danger because they shared the attackers' goals: to block the ascent of the left to power. On the basis of this analysis, and knowing that a demonstration on behalf of Jewish rights would get nowhere, DAIA called for a protest strike by democratic sectors at all levels of society against terrorism by “Nazis” (meaning Nazi-influenced nativists). The theme was: “They’ll begin with the Jews and end with democracy.” The work stoppage, carried out on 28 June 1962 following the attack on Graciela Sirota, was a success, attracting considerable numbers of non-Jewish as well as Jewish participants. For their constituents, DAIA offered a defense of personal dignity as Jews and as Argentine citizens whose rights were being infringed.

The chaotic democracy that engulfed Argentina in the 1960s was brought to an end by General Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–70), who ousted Illia and initiated the destruction of Argentine intellectual life by pillaging the universities. Libraries burned books, plays were proscribed, intellectual and artistic life virtually shut down throughout the country, in a period argentinos describe as maccartismo, but which went a great deal further than McCarthyism in the United States. Repression of faculty and students and the closing of universities during this regime led to the flight into exile of a large number of Argentine intellectuals and artists, and came close to destroying the country’s intellectual and artistic life. Not surprisingly, with nacionalistas in power, anti-Semitism became another instrument of policy. Under Onganía, all Jewish officials were removed from government posts, and assassinations and acts of hooliganism against Jews went unpunished.

At the same time, numerous fascist organizations were operating in Argentina, fueled by ideas scavenged from the wreckage of the Third Reich. It is not necessary to imagine sophisticated Nazis seducing naive Argentines into adopting their agenda: their message resonated sufficiently within local culture to make itself at home in criollo terms. Thirty years after the collapse of Nazism in Europe, its ideology was alive and thriving in Argentina, Peru, and Chile. In the latter country, Dignidad, an enclosed community of neo-Nazis, survived intact. Extreme right-wing newspapers and magazines such as El Fortín, Cabildo, Restauración, and Patria Peronista were peddling anti-Semitism with articles such as one that declaimed, “We confirm that the white slave trade and drug traffic are two instruments utilized by Zionist imperialism to corrupt our youth. This should be investigated as a conspiracy against our nation.” Organizations such as Tacuara, Falange de Fe (Córdoba), Centuria Universitaria Nacionalista, Falange Restaurador Nacionalista, Centuria Nacionalista, Agrupación Nacionalista Argentina, and Partido Acción Nacionalista, all were propagating a line based on hatred of Jews as cosmopolitans who imported foreign ideas—communism and capitalism—that corrupt the body politic. In support of the charge of a Jewish plot to subjugate Argentines to “international bankers,” a government-controlled television station broadcast in February 1975 a dramat-
zation of La Bolsa (The Stock Exchange), the hoary anti-Semitic libel that newspapers had serialized three generations earlier. The "Andinia Plan," fabricated by the professional anti-Semite Walter Beveraggi Allende, popularized the paranoid delusion that there existed an international conspiracy to create a second Jewish state in the south of Argentina.

While coping with the threat from the right, Jews also came under attack from the left. Radical groups aligned with Middle Eastern guerrilla factions became overtly anti-Semitic in the seventies, drawing on racial prejudice to bolster their anti-Zionist agenda, not only in Argentina but all across Latin America. Revolutionary groups established contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, working toward an alliance of Third World revolutionaries whose principal target rapidly became Israel, and by extension, Jews anywhere in the world. In neighboring Brazil, the combination of dependence on Arab oil, a rapid transition from dictatorship to democracy, and agitation by professional anti-Semites among left-wing supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization triggered vituperative attacks against Jews. Jews were attacked for having links with Israel, and Israel for having links with imperialist powers (the United States, Great Britain, the International Monetary Fund) that allegedly held the continent in a position of economic dependency.¹⁰

These radical groupings attracted Jewish as well as non-Jewish students. In the 1960s and 1970s, multitudes of university-educated Jewish youth were becoming as alienated from the Jewish establishment as non-Jewish youth were from the criollo establishment. By 1976, fewer than 10 percent of Buenos Aires Jewish youth (estimated at a total 90,000) belonged to any Jewish community institution. Among university students, the proportion of the affiliated was just 5.8 percent.¹¹ The revolutionary movements sweeping South and Central America caught up these unaffiliated Jewish youths. There were Jewish Montoneros in Argentina and Tupamaros in Uruguay, Jewish Cubans in the ranks of the revolutionaries of 1959, and Jewish Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the seventies. In the process of joining the revolution, they distanced themselves from other Jews and from Judaism, either as a matter of principle or in order to establish their credentials with their comrades in arms. The hostility of left-wing groups toward Israel exerted pressure on these young Jews to prove their exclusively national loyalties by dropping their ties to Jews and Judaism.¹²

Having adopted the stance of the militant left, these Jews viewed Israel as an imperialist power, allied with the oppressor class they were rebelling against. A full-scale civil war broke out in Argentina in 1970, with left-wing guerrillas organized in the Revolutionary Popular Army (ERP by its Spanish initials) and Montoneros (an offshoot of peronism) in armed rebellion against a series of corrupt and inefficient governments. Right-wing gangs, organized as the Argentine Anticomunist Alliance, or Triple A, began kidnapping and murdering leftists, apparently with the connivance of the police. Among other violent
acts, attacks on Jewish institutions and individuals escalated. Buenos Aires became a center for the publication of anti-Semitic literature, handed out freely to pedestrians on La Florida and other shopping streets, some of which went so far as to incite pogroms ("save the fatherland—kill a Jew" ran one slogan). The administration of President Isabel Martínez de Perón, under the dominance of her adviser, the spiritualist José López Rega (who may have been the sponsor of the AAA), was using anti-Semitism as an instrument of terror. Given Argentina's history of oscillation between ungovernable democracy and brutal authoritarian rule, by 1976 many middle-class Argentines viewed a military junta pledged to restoring constitutional norms as the lesser among several evils. This judgment was concurred in by the organized Jewish community, as represented through the DAIA.

Dirty War

The military junta that took power in 1976 terminated the threat from the Left by means of a "Dirty War" aimed at physically exterminating subversion. Many Jews, like other middle class citizens, anticipated relief from the harassments, kidnappings, and politically motivated murders that had characterized the Left's assault on organized society. Unfortunately, in practice, the military were more violent than the guerrillas, better armed and organized, more anti-Semitic, and able to utilize the figleaf of legitimacy to act on their murderous ideology. As the then Chief of Buenos Aires Police, Colonel Ramón Camps, said at the time: "First, we will kill the guerrillas. Then we will kill the guerrillas’ families. Then we will kill the friends of their families, and the friends of their friends, so that there will be no one left to remember who the guerrillas were."

The junta, organized as the Process of National Reorganization (called the proceso), acted on this premise by killing an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 civilians, many with no record of political activity of any kind. (The Commission appointed later to investigate the matter was able to document 8,800 cases, but many families were too frightened to come forward to report their losses.) As planned, disappearances occurred in chain reaction.

Aída Leonora Bruschttein was a single woman of twenty-four who taught literacy in the slums of Monte Chingolo, greater Buenos Aires. She was maltreated and shot, before witnesses, by uniformed personnel of Battalion 601 (Intelligence) of the Argentine army. She was identified through fingerprints taken from her hands, which were sent to her family in a jar. The Bruschttein family initiated a lawsuit against the army for homicide. While the matter was sub judice, a group of armed men, dressed in civilian clothes and backed by twenty carloads of soldiers, invaded the home of her parents in the center of the city in broad daylight. Aída Leonora's father, sixty years old and a biochemist, was in bed convalescing from a heart attack. The intruders, shouting, "How dare you charge the Argentine army with homicide, Jew son-of-a-bitch," dragged the invalid from his bed and carried him away with great
brutality. The act was never acknowledged officially, and his body was never found.

Adrian Sidon, fiancé of Aída Leonora, was killed by the police on a public sidewalk. His body was never delivered to his father, a well-known lawyer and entrepreneur who demanded it persistently.

Patricia Villa, sister of a daughter-in-law of the Bruschteins, was detained while working in the office of Inter Press in Buenos Aires, before numerous witnesses. One week later, her family was notified by the navy that Patricia had died, but they did not indicate where she had been buried. The authorities demanded that the family keep the episode secret, or what had happened to other members of the family would happen to them also.

At six in the morning, in a joint operation of the federal police and the army, Irene Bruschttein de Ginsburg, sister of Aída Leonora, and her husband, Mario Ginsburg, were detained. She was an artist and he a master workman and student of architecture. Their children Victoria, not quite three years old, and Hugo Roberto, eighteen months, were abandoned at the door of the building where their parents were sequestered. They remain permanently disappeared.

One month earlier, Victor Rafael Bruschttein, seventeen, had been detained in the home where he resided with his mother, in Moron, province of Buenos Aires. He also disappeared.

Edy Kaufman, a respected investigator of human rights abuses, estimates that Jews accounted for close to 10 percent of the disappeared, far exceeding the proportion of Jews in the population at large or even within those professions—university faculty, social workers, psychiatrists, union leaders, literacy teachers—that were specifically targeted. Testimony of prisoners freed from some of the 304 detention centers maintained by the proceso confirms that Jewish prisoners were singled out for particularly abusive treatment, often to the accompaniment of verbal assaults that mimicked Nazi rhetoric. Of course, 90 percent of victims were Christian, mostly Catholic like their victimizers, and they included priests and nuns as well as lay religious leaders.

Strangely, it was difficult to discern immediately the orientation of the military junta toward Jews and the Jewish community. Mainline Jewish institutions were not attacked. Jewish parents were not slow to draw conclusions, enrolling their children in community schools, synagogues, and sports clubs where activities focused on strictly Jewish concerns (religion, Israel, Hebrew-centered education), soaking up the youngsters' time that might otherwise have been spent getting involved with suspect groups.

Censorship of the press, plus fear of speaking out, made it difficult to understand exactly what was going on, and some interviewees claimed that they were unaware of the repression until they made a trip abroad and were able to read about ongoing atrocities in the foreign press. The conflicting opinions of community leaders were reported by Israeli embassy officials and are just now being extracted from that government's archives. On one side were those who believed the junta members themselves were not anti-Semitic;
they accepted the generals’ statement that, in battling subversion, which threatened the very existence of the state, “excesses” (such as torture and summary execution of prisoners) could be expected to occur, that such acts were not sanctioned by the junta but were the work of gangs they were powerless to control. Those who believed the statements of the moderados (moderates) led by Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla concluded that the atrocities being committed against detenidos (those who were arrested and held in jail) and desaparecidos (those who had been snatched off the street or from their home and made to disappear without trace) occurred either because the victims had been involved in the subversion or because they were the unfortunate victims of unauthorized actions by militias operating independently of the junta. No doubt there were anti-Semites among the personnel who carried out these actions, but anti-Semitism was not a settled policy of the junta. People who accepted these assurances did so in part because they believed that behind the moderate faction waited the duras—hardliners who included in their ranks known anti-Semites whom the community had good reason to fear.

In May 1976, DAIA president Nehemias Resnitzky traveled to New York to press this point of view. He had been assured, he told representatives of North American Jewish organizations, that the junta would restore democracy after fixing the economy and that official anti-Semitism was out of the question because Argentina needed U.S. financial support. The extreme right of the Argentine political spectrum, however, was capable of using anti-Semitism to distract people from their real problems. He pleaded with U.S. organizations not to publicize crimes against Jews in order not to fall into what he described as a trap by leftist groups to discredit the junta with charges of anti-Semitism and thereby leave it vulnerable to a putsch by the duras.16

The other school of thought held that the scale of government repression far outweighed the danger posed initially by the ERP, Montoneros, and various Maoist groups. By May 1977 the armed subversion had been physically exterminated, but the repression ground on. Rumors of the existence of moderate and hardline factions were only a version of the “good cop, bad cop” routine familiar to every police interrogator. The specter of a putsch by hardliners was a ploy to get the gullible to go along with the junta, which really was in control of the actions of its “wild men” and was using state terror as an instrument of governance.

The sadistic behavior of camp guards and their commandants did not emerge from nowhere. The way had been prepared for it by years of racist articles and cartoons in literature and the press; sermons by Catholic priests whose anti-Semitism went unrebuked by their bishops; rallies of nationalist organizations; anti-Semitic graffiti and vandalism at Jewish institutions; letters and telephone calls to community leaders threatening mayhem to themselves and their families; bombs placed in synagogues; kidnappings, and physical attacks on Jews.17 Such actions, and popular as well as governmental acquiescence in them, laid the basis for the explosion of anti-Semitism that took place within the protected precincts of proceso prisons. Yet, as much as one year
In this diagram of the Argentine military mind, the tree of subversion grows out of the tap root of Zionism and its collatorals, Marxism and Freemasonry. From these roots grow (1) societies and leagues for defense of human rights, women's rights, pacifism, non-aggression, disarmament, "etc." Communist parties spring directly from the trunk of subversion. Socialist parties sprout (2) national, (3) Argentine, (4) vanguard, and (5) democratic branches. Revolutionary armed organizations include the (7) Montoneros, (8) FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces), and ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) in addition to the spectral (6) Other. Indirect aggression caps the tree of subversion, sprouting (9) union corruption, (10) secular education, (11) liberal economics, (12) liberal politics, (13) drug addiction, alcoholism, prostitution, and gambling, (14) the Third World, (15) postconciliar modernism, (16) progressive Catholicism, (17) liberal Christianity, (18) hippie-ism, pornography, homosexuality, and divorce, and (19) the mass media, including art, the press, radio, TV, cinema, magazines, and books. Sectarian anti-Christian Protestantism subverts society through (20) "American noblemen of fire," (21) evangelism, (22) Angel Lodge, (23) Mormonism, (24) Jehovah's Witnesses, (25) Modern school New Acropolis, (26) Hare Krishna, and (27) Siolismo-Youth Power. Liberal Democracy spawns (28) Radicals, (29) Christian Democracy, (30) Social Democracy, (31) Populist Demagogy. Surprisingly, the extreme right branch of totalitarianism (Nazism-Fascism) appears to have no offshoots at all in Argentina; but Freemasonry leads directly to the threat of (32) Rotary Club, Lion's Club, and Junior Chamber. (The original drawing, "La subversión," was obtained and translated by Edy Kaufman and is reproduced in "Jewish Victims of Repression in Argentina under Military Rule, 1976-1983."
after the coup, the Jewish community seemed unconcerned about anti-Semitic attacks by the junta. This may have occurred in part because they had grown inured to the level of free-floating anti-Semitism that had always surrounded them. But their apparent willful ignoring of reality also stemmed from the fact that the censored press misrepresented the deaths of prisoners who had been tortured and executed without trial as having resulted from armed confrontations between the armed forces and the guerrillas. This caused some observers to blame parents of the disappeared for not having brought up their children “correctly.” It took years for many civilians to realize that the nacionalista forces had moved beyond random acts of terror to the systematic use of terror to cow them into submission. In coming to power, the military gained the capacity to activate its paranoid fantasies through the machinery of the state. The primitive notions of what or who a Jew might be were transcribed in dozens of prison interrogations and recorded in survivors’ memoirs. Their worldview is graphically displayed in the diagram “La Subversión” (see opposite page) included in a pamphlet found on the desk of the vice-director of the Escuela Superior de Guerra Aérea in 1980 and evidently intended for distribution to the officer cadets. The barbarity of its conception is exceeded only by its lack of understanding of the real world.

The Dirty War was plainly directed against “subversives,” but much depended on the definition of that term. For nacionalistas, activism on behalf of the poor subverts society, campaigns for women’s rights subvert the family, and belief in a subconscious subverts Christianity. These were presented as specifically Jewish crimes, the culprits: Marx, Marcuse, and Freud (but not Jesus). Practitioners in these fields were especially targeted by the regime; and Jews were disproportionately numbered among them. Were they being disappeared and tortured for these suspect activities, or did being Jewish constitute a suspect category in itself?

Onganía’s anti-intellectual campaign turned out to have been only a prelude to the large-scale winnowing of intellectuals and artists, community outreach workers, labor union leaders, social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists undertaken by the generals of the Process of National Reorganization. Demonized as subverters of the social order and perverters of Christian family values, Jewish professionals fled to Mexico, Spain, Israel, and the United States. The extinction or exodus of the talented added a bitter epilogue to the history of immigration policy. Governments at the beginning of the twentieth century had preferred farmers to intellectuals. Two generations later, elites were still trying to prevent foreign ideas from contaminating criollo minds.

Argentina was not alone in adopting an authoritarian-bureaucratic style of governing in the 1970s. Contemporary Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Chilean dictatorships likewise targeted men and women they identified as communists and labor agitators, incidentally sending to their deaths numerous innocents who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Jews were among those killed by these governments, not for being Jews, but because they were suspected of subversive activity. Only in Argentina was there a distinct anti-Semitic
component to the repression. The Argentine military surpassed their colleagues in other countries by their untrammeled acting out of Nazi-style anti-Semitism.

Many testimonies of Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners document the fact that, from the moment of detention up until the decision to "transfer" and in many cases to execute the victims, there existed a tendency toward negative preferential treatment of Jews. This was manifest, in the first place, in plainly anti-Semitic oral expressions, including references of a religious-traditional type about the Jew as Antichrist; and in a vocabulary of clear Nazi derivation; also in the interrogations about the objectives of Zionism and its anti-Argentine activities. In the second place, the existence of Nazi inscriptions and emblems in the detention centers has been documented; and in the methods used to destroy the personality of the victim, an anti-Jewish dimension played a part in psychological torture as well as in accentuated brutality. Finally, it is possible to establish that, in the selection of victims for sacrifice by means of "transfer," priority was given to the Jewish disappeared.20

Moreover, the Argentine military brought the Church hierarchy along with them. A 1966 concordat with the Vatican, initiated by the democratic administration of Illia and confirmed by General Onganía, provided the basis for agreement (convivencia) between the army and the church, and identification of the military with Catholic dogma. Although the struggle for dominance by the one over the other never ceased, the posture of the Argentine church coincided more with the military regime of the proceso than with the Brazilian and Chilean church hierarchies that, in similar circumstances, confronted their own authoritarian regimes over issues of human rights.21

The actions of the junta have been scrutinized by foreign observers as well as by the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP), and the Argentine courts. Appointed in 1983, CONADEP comprised individuals with national and international reputations as defenders of human rights; it included two Jewish human rights advocates, Professor Gregorio Klimovsky and Rabbi Marshall Meyer. Their report, as well as subsequent judicial proceedings against members of the junta, proved that thousands of people had been illegally deprived of their freedom, tortured and killed in secret prisons and concentration camps. Atrocities were the common practice, the normal method of daily operation that could not have occurred without the approval of top commanders. Moreover, the commission of the most heinous crimes against Jewish Argentines was licensed and condoned by the anti-Semitic ideology at the top of the military hierarchy.22 The response of nacionalistas was to describe the published report as a Jewish conspiracy aimed at besmirching the honor of the Argentine military.

The role of the DAIA during the Dirty War quickly became, and has remained, a focus of bitter controversy. Accused of passivity in the face of anti-Semitic outrages, the kehillah leadership was able to point to the fact that the Catholic Church had not been able to protect its own people; and that the DAIA had at least protected its member institutions from physical invasion.
Without verbally expressing the distinction, DAIA may be said to have eschewed responsibility for Jewish Argentines who were not affiliated with the kehillah and who were thus (in the words of one kehilla president) "not even Jewish." Defined out of the community by proprietary criteria of membership and by their own choice, unaffiliated Jews fell victim in significant numbers to the military's paranoid delusions regarding Jewish proclivities toward subversion.

**Falklands War**

By 1982, the repression had succeeded in eliminating political dissent but Argentina's economy was a shambles. In a desperate gamble to regain public approval, the generals played the irredentist card, invading the islands that Argentines call the Malvinas. Under their English name, the Falklands had been ruled by the British for a century, but the Argentines had never given up their claim. Britain, the United States, and the European Community all froze arms shipments to Argentina when the invasion took place, and requested that other trading partners do the same. Israel, however, continued making deliveries of goods already contracted for.

The war held up a funhouse mirror to the political alignments of the day. Though Argentina had suppressed her own leftists, her chief military suppliers were the USSR and Cuba. Israeli arms deliveries established rapport with the most anti-Semitic elements in Argentina. Perhaps as a quid pro quo, the army for the first time permitted the appointment of Jewish army chaplains (no one of Jewish origin had been commissioned above the rank of captain in the Argentine army since 1934). In the atmosphere of chauvinist exhilaration that characterized the first days of the war, the kehillah became the first ethnic community officially to express loyalty to the junta. The DAIA was quick to pledge allegiance in a statement linking Argentina's drive to recover the Malvinas with the Jewish people's desire to recover the land of their ancestors.

**Jews in Argentine Politics**

In Argentina, the notion of Jews in public office is still viewed by nacionalistas as a betrayal of traditional values, a reversal of natural law. The idea of Jews exercising power over Christians has been taboo in Spanish culture since the fifteenth century. Nacionalistas who remain enthralled by the preconciliar past view the ascension of Jews to positions of public trust as prima facie evidence of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy, beachheads for the advancement of foreign, subversive ideas. Thus the election or appointment of Jews to public office, and their retention there, tests the readiness of these sectors to break from the medieval past.

When President Frondizi assumed office in 1958, he appointed a number of Jews to his administration, including the country's first Jewish cabinet minister, David Blejer, as minister of labor. Santiago Nudelman, a physician, lawyer, and national deputy, was an important figure in the Unión Cívica Radical. Four Jewish delegates were elected to the Argentine House of Representatives in
the same election; two other Jews were elected governors that year, in Neuquén and Formosa. At the very same time, the anti-Semitic demonstrations described above were taking place without attracting Frondizi's attention or concern. More Jews were elected to national office in 1963, but officeholders were removed arbitrarily by the military coup of 1966. No Jewish official survived the purges that took place under the presidency of Juan Carlos Onganía. The record shows that Jews attain official positions during democratic interludes but are removed by right-wing and military governments, as much for their Jewishness as for their politics.

In 1973, with the advent of the peronista government of Héctor Campora, two Jews were appointed to top positions: one as undersecretary of interior, the other as finance minister. However, following the death of Perón, finance minister José Ber Gelbard, a former peddler and the second Jew to reach cabinet rank, became the focus of an anti-Semitic campaign launched by López Rega, adviser to President Isabel Perón. After being dismissed from his position, Gelbard was stripped of his citizenship and deported. Attacks on Gelbard also targeted the Jewish businessmen's association that he had headed. The anti-Semitism that surfaced at this time shook the confidence of the Jewish community that the excesses of the Onganía period had ended.

No Jew was elected or appointed to public office during the proceso. When the junta dissolved in disarray, the election of Raúl Alfonsín to the presidency in October 1983 marked a watershed in Argentine history. In that election, six Jews were elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Two years later, Jewish candidates won 11 of 254 seats, or 4.3 percent, higher than the proportion of Jews in the Argentine population. Increased acceptability of Jewish candidates was demonstrated by the fact that these deputies were elected from various provinces and from both the Radical and Justicialista (peronist) parties. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate chose Jews to serve among its leadership: César Jaroslavsky was elected majority leader of the Chamber, and Senator Adolfo Gass became chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Only two of fourteen competing political parties did not include Jews on their ballots, and Jewish identity did not become an issue during the campaign. "Overall, the Argentine electorate displayed a much more sophisticated and rational understanding of candidates and issues than in the past." President Alfonsín appointed a number of Jews to his administration, including Bernardo Grinspun as minister of finance and later as minister of planning; Leopoldo Portnoy as vice-president of the Central Bank, Mario Brodersohn as treasury secretary, Oscar Oszák as undersecretary of research and administrative reform, and Roberto Schteingart as undersecretary of state for information and development. Adolfo Stubrin as minister of education, Manuel Sadosky as secretary of state for science and technology; Oscar Shuberoff as rector of the University of Buenos Aires, as well as the appointment of Jewish deans, and especially the appointment of Marcos Aguinis, a well-known Jewish psychoanalyst and writer, to the post of undersecretary of culture, signified recognition of the multicultural reality of the country but enraged the Catholic Church.
and its allies. These appointments aroused a campaign to discredit the administration as "la sinagoga Radical" ("Radical" is the name of Alfonsin's centrist party: *sinagoga* is defined by Spanish-language dictionaries as "conspiracy") and Jewish officials were accused of infiltrating the government on behalf of "international Zionism." General Ramon Camps, the "hero" of the military repression in Buenos Aires responsible for gross human rights violations during the processo, published a book in which he charged that Jewish banking interests were subverting the state and warning of Zionist infiltration. Nevertheless, these appointments held, and prepared the way for amendment of the constitution so as to eliminate the requirement that the president of the nation be a communicant of the Catholic Church.

Peronista Carlos Saúl Menem, a Catholic born into a Muslim family that originated in Syria, followed Alfonsin in the presidency. Menem showed sensitivity to Jewish issues, becoming the first Argentine president to send his foreign minister on a visit to Israel. He apparently utilized his special relationship to ask the government of Syria to look into the fate of missing Israeli prisoners of war. He is known to have close advisers who are Jews (such as Samuel Muzykanski and Moises Ikonicoff) and has appointed Jewish peronistas to important posts in his administration, including Carlos Vladimiro Corach as minister of interior and Deputy Justice Minister Elias Jassan.

Disintegration

It was in this democratic period that Argentine Jewry suffered its most devastating blow. On Monday morning, 18 July 1994, at a few moments before ten, a bomb destroyed the AMIA building in downtown Buenos Aires, bringing to an end a decade of hope that had begun with the elections of 1983. Eighty-six persons were killed, hundreds maimed, and the building itself was destroyed. The terrorists who planned and carried out the attack—like those who had destroyed the embassy of Israel two years earlier—knew exactly what they were doing. They had struck at the functioning heart of the Jewish community.

The damage caused by destruction of the building and loss of life was compounded by a surge of hoaxes perpetrated against survivors and telephoned threats of "we'll get you next." Perhaps the unkindest cut came from sympathizers who regretted that "not just Jews but innocent people" had been killed. Thousands of citizens came out to demonstrate against race hatred and terror, but others responded by distancing themselves emotionally and geographically from the hazard they perceived as emanating from too close association with the victims. Jewish institutions now had difficulty renewing their leases. Jewish soccer teams found themselves canceled out of league competitions, and the erection of concrete barriers in front of Jewish schools created the atmosphere of a ghetto, something that had never existed in Argentina. To the suggestion that a motive for the attack may have been to destroy Nazi archives which President Menem had recently handed over to the DAIA for analysis, one
AMIA—Comunidad Judía de Buenos Aires—is the principal organization of Argentine Jewry. Its building at 633 Pasteur, in the heart of the old Jewish district of Once, housed a library, archives, social welfare agencies, a labor exchange, publishing and cultural activities.

A researcher responded, “In Argentina, no one would be embarrassed to be publicly revealed as a Nazi.”

To date, the perpetrators have not been apprehended, leading to the suspicion that they never will be. The perpetrators of the earlier attack on the Israeli Embassy, which left 30 dead and 250 injured, have never been caught. Suspicion in both cases focused on pro-Iranian Hezbollah, but this was never proved; in any event, terrorism experts believe the attacks could not have succeeded without local help, possibly from among disgruntled soldiers and police who believed themselves unjustly accused of criminal behavior for having followed orders to torture or assassinate prisoners during the Dirty War. Such persons likewise have never been identified or apprehended.

The long-run outcome of the bombing of AMIA has yet to unfold. The Jews of Argentina, who had had ample reason for discontent with their major institution, rallied to renovate and rebuild the AMIA. A process of communal self-evaluation got under way. Conceivably, public revulsion at the massacre of innocents may lead to a moderation of anti-Semitic rhetoric as the legacy of
On 18 July 1994, the AMIA building was destroyed by an explosive device. The perpetrators were never apprehended. Eighty-nine persons were killed and dozens more maimed. Most of the victims were Jews, but others, the radio reported, "were innocent."
Jews in Politics: Beyond Argentina

The path by which Jewish Latinos might participate in national politics was never clearly marked. The electoral process functions only partially and intermittently in Latin America. Where it functions, it does so in a manner that does not necessarily enfranchise individuals or small interest groups; and Jews are nowhere numerous enough seriously to affect an electoral outcome. Powerful corporate bodies are usually the chief political actors: the armed forces, associations of urban or rural entrepreneurs, labor unions, the church. Each views its own interests as paramount; each defends its turf from “meddling” by the larger society, an attitude that has been called “the politics of anti-politics.” The military is quite explicit about its mandate to interpret the “will of the people,” regardless of what the constitution or the electorate may have to say about the matter, a view that is widespread in Latin America. Political parties are forced to maneuver within extremely limited space. Jews, who are unrepresented in the church, landed oligarchy, army, labor unions, or peasant syndicates, wield no influence within these institutions.

Chile in the years of the Unidad Popular government (1970–73) tested the limits of acceptability of Jews in high public office. The Chileanization policies of Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, which aimed at creating a socialist society through law, were in part designed by Senator Volodia Teitelboim, chief strategist of Chile’s Communist party who as a youth had belonged to Hashomer Hatzair, the left wing of the Zionist movement. Allende appointed other Jews as well to key posts in his administration, including David Baytelman in Agrarian Reform, David Silberman in Copper Administration, Jaime Faivovich in the city government of Santiago, Jacobo Schaulsohn on the Constitutional Court, Enrique Kirberg at the Technical University, Enrique Testa at the Defense Ministry, and Luis Vega at the Ministry of Interior. The policies they designed and implemented conformed both to the traditional Jewish demand for social justice and to the Chilean people’s demand for social and economic equity, as reflected in the election of Allende to the presidency. But their participation had the effect of intensifying attacks on the president as the pawn of Jewish Bolsheviks. The upsurge of anti-Semitism that accompanied the introduction of Allende’s program took as its target not just those Jews who were members of his administration but the entire community, which was held responsible for the fact that some Jews are Marxists.

Given Chile’s tradition of tolerance, the effort failed to arouse popular passions against Jews. But right-wing agitation was just one horn of the dilemma. The election of Allende on a Marxist platform had triggered mass abandonment of the country by middle-class entrepreneurs who feared expropriation of their
property, as had happened ten years before in Cuba. Among those who departed were some 8,000 of Chile’s 30,000 Jews. These were mainly the wealthy, property owners, and members of the communal establishment, and they left despite friendly overtures by the new administration. The flight of the wealthiest members of the Jewish community and the loss of their financial contributions damaged Jewish institutions, a blow the now smaller and poorer community had difficulty absorbing. This was one minor element in the whirlwind of chaos that overtook Chile. In September 1973, a military junta, encouraged by the United States government, overthrew Allende and set about reestablishing a reassuring climate for business.

Once the climate stabilized, many middle-class persons, Jews among them, returned to the country. They were encouraged by the tactics of General Augusto Pinochet, who explicitly rejected anti-Semitism and made a point of attending Rosh Hashanah services in a Santiago synagogue. But Jews were now more aware than ever of their dependence on the goodwill of the powers that be, and were apprehensive that they would pay the price of social experimentation. That a considerable cohort of Jewish individuals had worked for Allende, and that other Jews returned to Chile under Pinochet underscores the fact that Jews are influenced by the same ideologies as motivate non-Jews and that most Jews behave like other members of their economic class. Jews lived in Chile under violent swings of government from right to left and back again, but leaders of the organized community might well conclude that in circumstances that are likely to degenerate into civil war, a studied neutrality offers the best protection.

Jews are more diffused politically through the governing structures of Brazil than any other of the republics. The record shows far greater openness to Jewish political initiative than exists in the Spanish-speaking republics. Individuals from the important commercial families Lafer, Klabin, Moses, Bloch, and Levy have entered politics as ministers of state, bankers, and presidential advisers. There are Jews in numerous government posts and in significant military positions. By 1977, there were three Jews in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as several Jewish state legislators and councilmen. Two federal agencies—the National Housing Bank and the Brazilian Institute for Statistics and Geography—were headed by Jewish individuals. Curitiba, capital of the state of Paraná, has elected itself two Jewish mayors. The state secretary of transport for Rio de Janeiro, the state secretary of planning for São Paulo, and the state secretary of science, culture and technology are posts that have been held by Jews. The administration of President Fernando Collor de Melo reversed the Brazilian position at the United Nations to cancel its acquiescence in Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. The succeeding administration of Fernando Henrique Cardozo, a renowned economist, gained the confidence and support of the Jewish community. In recent years, Jaime Lerner beat back an attempt to rouse anti-Semitic feeling against him to be elected governor of the state of Paraná.

In Mexico, electoral outcomes have been predetermined within the hege-
monic Partido Revolucionario Institucional. PRI, its revolutionary credentials somewhat tainted by its fifty-year monopoly of power, is only now beginning to be effectively challenged by rivals. It can be surmised that Jewish Mexicans first achieved some political influence after 1975, as a result of the threat by United States Jews to boycott Mexican goods if the government did not rescind its affirmative vote on the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism. That did not happen officially until 1992, but in the interim, relations between the government and the Jewish community measurably improved, despite frequent sackings and desecrations of Jewish cemeteries by persons unknown. Personal contact and discreet financial contributions may take the place of the ballot, which is as ineffective for Jews as a group as it is for other would-be power contenders who cannot control a mass of “voters.” As a small urban minority, Jews cannot compete with landowners who truck their peons to the polling station to cast their open ballots.

The growing acceptance of cultural pluralism in Mexico (manifested by government funding for publication of books on Mexican Jewish history and sponsorship of an international conference on Latin American Jewry), and perhaps also the government’s recognition of the importance to the national economy of Mexican Jewish businessmen and industrialists with connections to the United States, has led to the appointment of Jews to government positions. Most of these are technical in nature. A series of modernizing Mexican presidents have relied increasingly on technocrats, including Jewish ones, and Ernesto Zedillo’s government includes Arturo Warman, secretary of agrarian reform; Santiago Levy, undersecretary for expenditures; Jaime Zabludovsky, undersecretary for communications; and Jacques Rogozinsky, director of tourism. These appointments, as well as the election of Esther Koleteniuk to the city council of Mexico City, mark a clear departure from the past.

The 1990s have been a breakthrough decade for the acceptance of Jews in public office in Peru. As is well known, that country already had elected a Nisei president, Alberto Fujimoro; it next acquired a Jewish prime minister, Efraín Goldberg-Schreiber. The son of Russian Jewish immigrants, Goldberg was born in the Pacific coast town of Talara, where he was the only Jewish child in his primary school. He attended high school and San Marcos University in Lima, earning a law degree before entering his family’s export business. He also served on the board of the Lima Jewish community association. While Jewish political appointees have commonly been chosen from among businessmen, political activism was the background for selection of Moisés Jarmusz Levy as Bolivia’s minister of development and environment by the president of Bolivia in 1992. Jarmusz Levy had been executive secretary of a Bolivian political party allied with the government. In Santiago de Chile, Marcos Libedinsky became the first Jew to be named to that country’s Supreme Court and Benjamin Teplitzky Lilavetzky was appointed minister of mining. Both men are active members of the Santiago Jewish community. Milos Alcalay was appointed director general of the Venezuelan foreign ministry. In Costa Rica, while Sandra Piszk and Saul Weisleder were elected to Parliament and
German Weinstok was appointed minister of health, Rebeca Grynspan was elected vice-president of the country.\textsuperscript{35}

The fact that many current appointees are active in their local Jewish community marks a departure from past practice, when nearly all those who entered public life had previously dropped any connection to Jews and Judaism. Furthermore, until the 1980s, Jewish individuals were appointed exclusively to offices involved with finance, conforming to the nacionalista mystique that “Jews are good with money.” This situation is now changing, with greater numbers of Jewish individuals being appointed to a wider range of offices, while retaining their identification as Jews.

\textit{Jews in Politics: A Schematic View}

This roster of non-hispanic names in Latin American politics announces a significant change in social attitudes, one that acknowledges the citizenship rights of Jews. A meaningful future for Jews is difficult to envision without admittance to political participation. It may therefore be a useful exercise to review the conditions under which Jews are able to participate in politics in Latin America. This question can be viewed from three different perspectives: that of society at large, the organized Jewish community, and politically active Jewish individuals; and in three different contexts: democracies, authoritarian states, and under revolutionary conditions.\textsuperscript{36}

From the standpoint of society at large. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama have all elected respectable numbers of Jewish candidates to public office during democratic periods. No legal barriers to their election or appointment are known to exist, but ancient hatreds may surface when partisanship becomes heated, or may be deliberately employed in order to drive a wedge through the ranks of the opposing party. The periods 1958–62 and 1983–85 in Argentina and 1970–73 in Chile demonstrated this political schizophrenia: Jews were elected to office, but nacionalistas attacked the government for being “under the control of Jews.”

Authoritarian regimes restrict political participation by all citizens, often converting political interests to financial ones. Robert Levine records an instructive incident from 1930s Cuba. “Relations between the Jewish colony and officialdom followed the rather personalistic formula required by the fact that Batista was de facto the head of state. When anti-Semitic broadcasts on one radio station increased in bellicosity in 1935, representatives from the UHC [United Hebrew Congregations] paid a visit to Batista during which they pledged ten thousand dollars toward the campaign to build a new national library; and they used the opportunity to ask that something be done about the broadcasts. Batista denied that he had any power to influence things but . . . within a few days unknown vandals smashed the radio station, and the offensive broadcasts were stilled.” Jews are not found in nacionalista administrations, though presumably these accept emoluments as well. Revolutionary regimes tend to be more puritanic, since they come to power on a platform
of cleansing corruption. Furthermore, nations in turmoil face problems of such magnitude that there is usually a desire to avoid complications arising from concern for the status of Jewish citizens; in Castro’s Cuba as in Allende’s Chile, care was taken to protect the regime against charges of anti-Semitism. Sandinistas too reacted quickly to the perception that their actions might have been prejudicial to Nicaraguan Jews.

In considering the political process from the perspective of the organized Jewish communities, it should be remembered that the kehillot originated in the desire to develop a base for working out coherent policies on issues that concern Jews specifically. Representative bodies such as the Argentine DAIA are organized for the purpose of presenting a Jewish point of view to the government on such issues as the free exercise of religion, lay education, and the situation of Jews abroad. As in the United States and many European countries, governments find it useful to have a single channel of communication, and may even request that one be formed; they may also require that the community name a chief rabbi to fill this role, as did General Pinochet in Chile.  

Transactions between a kehillah and an authoritarian regime cannot be completely known because of the closed nature of such regimes. With unsanctioned political initiative suppressed, everyone’s principal concern is survival, if possible with one’s human, cultural, and economic characteristics intact. In the absence of regular political channels, evidence points to a considerable exercise of shtadlanut, or recourse to back channels. The strategy dates to the Middle Ages, when Jewish communities, politically immobilized by laws incarcerating them in ghettos, depended on the king to guarantee their safety. Shtadlanut may have been called into play in both Argentina and Chile in the 1970s, enabling Jewish institutions to escape physical invasion by government forces.

Shtadlanut would appear to have no place in postrevolutionary societies such as Castroite Cuba or Sandinista Nicaragua, where the victors are in rebellion against traditional patterns of behavior. As a practical matter, all the wealthy and politically sophisticated individuals who might conceivably fill the role of shtadlan (the intermediary) will have left the country by the time their talent is required. Under conditions of democracy, the kehillah loses authority and can no longer speak for its members, who pour out into general society via employment, education, intermarriage, and political engagement.

For individuals, being Jewish confers no advantage to a Latin American politician, which is why ambitious persons drop their relationship to the community. One thinks of Nestor Perl, peronista governor of the Argentine province of Chubut. But identification with Judaism is less of a handicap now than formerly, and increasing numbers of self-identified Jews are accepting the challenge of public service. The need of modernizing elites for educated, technically competent individuals can override residual prejudice; working relationships erode inherited prejudicial attitudes. Modernizers who recognize the need to make use of available talent appoint Jews to office on the basis of
their technical qualifications rather than their ancestry, and Jewish emphasis on education positioned thousands to take advantage of the new openness.

Under conditions of liberal democracy, the number of Jews holding public office rises dramatically, demonstrating enhanced acceptability of Jewish candidates among liberals as well as the existence of a reservoir of political talent and desire for public service that previously were locked up within the kehillah or confined to the business world. Jewish appointees appear to outnumber Jews who are elected to public office, though this observation has not been tested by research.

No Jews have been identified as serving right-wing authoritarian regimes. There are no doubt highly conservative Jews, some of whom may sympathize with the goals of such regimes, but the anti-Semitism inherent in the nacionalista orientation precludes their appointment to government office and mandates the expulsion of any who may already occupy a position. In revolutionary times, some Jews join the revolution, others leave the country, and the remainder stay put but adopt a low political profile. This happened in Cuba and Nicaragua, where the majority of community members left the country but individual Jews remained and continued with their lives.

Overall, one may say that individual Jews are motivated politically by the same forces that motivate non-Jews, but conditioned by the presence or absence of anti-Semitism. The kehillot have adapted to the entire range of governments that have exercised power in Latin America, but they have never been able to control the actions of individual Jews, who are free to drop their association with the community. Adaptation takes place through the increased acceptance of Jews in public life, and the emergence of politically sophisticated community leaders who have grown up in the national political system and learned how to work with it. As Latin as they are Jewish, these leaders adapt Jewish institutions to the exigencies imposed on them. So the communities have survived under every conceivable type of government, but they are diminishing in size as different socioeconomic classes, buffeted by left-wing revolution or right-wing repression, find they cannot survive under the prevailing regime and choose reluctantly to emigrate.

**Integration**

There were at all times in the history of Latin America individuals and classes who were uninterested in scapegoating and more concerned with the modernization of social attitudes. Masonic lodges, with their history of opposition from the church, were receptive to Jews as allies. Positivists in Brazil and Mexico welcomed European Jews as modernizers. Anticlericals deplore the teachings of the church with respect to Jews and sometimes become pronounced philo-Semites, collecting Jewish and converso memorabilia and endowing themselves retroactively with Sephardic ancestors. It has been noted that individual non-
conformists and rebels sometimes identify spontaneously with the ultimate nonconformity of Jews. In recent years, important elements within the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, particularly in Peru, Brazil, and Chile, have collaborated with the organized Jewish communities to reduce the level of free-floating anti-Semitism in the spirit of the enlightened encyclicals of John XXIII. Nevertheless, those who are most actively involved with ecumenical initiatives acknowledge that their efforts have not thus far penetrated popular consciousness. 

An optimistic view of relations between Jews and non-Jews was projected by a survey sponsored by the American Jewish Committee in 1992. Attitudes toward Jews and other immigrant groups were surveyed in five regions of Argentina (federal capital, Greater Buenos Aires, and Córdoba, Tucumán, and Santa Fe provinces) a decade after the junta’s dismissal from power. In order to distinguish between specifically anti-Semitic sentiments and generalized xenophobia aimed at all immigrants, the poll asked respondents to rate five immigrant groups—Italians, Paraguayans, Koreans, Jews, and Arabs. The survey found that 82 percent of respondents considered ethnic origin, nationality, and religion either “not very important” or “not important at all” in dealing with neighbors or colleagues at work. An even higher percentage had no objection to a son or daughter marrying a member of any of the five immigrant groups; only Italians scored higher than Jews. Seventy percent of respondents rejected the idea that the country would be better off without these ethnic groups, and 80 percent upheld the right of Jews, Protestants, Muslims, Evangelicals, and Buddhists to practice their religion freely. Jews were rated by 62 percent as the “most achievement-oriented” group; Italians were seen as the most devoted to family, with Jews running a close second. Ambivalence showed up in response to the question: “Would you say that in Argentina today, (group) or their descendants are part of the Argentine people or belong to a separate people?” On this, respondents split almost evenly. Forty-seven percent felt that Jewish immigrants and their descendants are separate peoples (Koreans appeared even more alien); while 49 percent responded that Jews are a part of the Argentine people.

The highest levels of anti-Semitism were found in the province of Tucumán, where traditional attitudes privileging cultural and religious homogeneity are most persistent. Also, the lower a person’s position on the socioeconomic ladder, the less likely was he or she to endorse cultural or religious pluralism.

While negative feelings toward Jews ... are a minority phenomenon in Argentine society, they do increase the lower one goes on the socioeconomic ladder, to the point that the lowest groups show a considerable degree of negativity. In general, for every one respondent at the high or middle levels expressing some form of rejection of Jews, four respondents on the lowest level do so.

Hostility toward Jews is also related to educational level: the more educated the individual, the less likely he or she is to manifest negative feelings toward Jews. Thus, while only 2 percent of college-educated
respondents assert that Jews are undesirable as immigrants, among those who have only an incomplete primary education such belief reaches 15 percent. Not surprisingly, the same applies to a pluralistic outlook in general, with college educated-respondents being most open to cultural and religious diversity. It is important to note that the less educated sectors show a greater hostility toward Jews than toward other minority groups.40

The generally positive perception of Jews found by this survey is surprising in the light of Argentine history and in view of other surveys that have been conducted periodically since at least 1919 and that have found higher levels of anti-Semitism.41 It points either to a reversal of historic beliefs (perhaps inspired by acknowledgment of the excesses to which these beliefs have led) or else to flaws in the design of the survey. Only time will tell which interpretation is nearer the truth. "In a violent society where public constraints against defamation are not very well institutionalized, the political culture of Argentina is ill-equipped to neutralize anti-Semitism, despite the enactment of anti-discrimination laws."42

During democratic interludes, not only Jewish politicians but Jewish intellectuals and artists become visible in the public sphere. Jews occupy faculty positions at institutions of higher learning in numbers that apparently exceed their proportion in the population, although many intellectuals of Jewish origin no longer consider themselves Jewish. Perhaps the area of greatest achievement by self-identified Jews has been literary. Fictional works by Jewish authors, widely sold throughout Latin America as well as in translation abroad, no longer portray the idealized landscape painted by Alberto Gerchunoff in his centenary homage to Argentina, Los gauchos judíos. The next generation of authors such as Mario Szichman, Germán Rozenmacher, Mario Goloboff, and Pedro Orgambide expressed disillusionment at Jewish marginalization and the ingenious ways in which the marginalized attempt to accommodate to their capricious, often malevolent circumstances. Contemporary Latin American Jewish authors such as Angelina Muñiz, Esther Seligson, Ilan Stavans, and Margo Glantz (Mexico), Victor Perera (Guatemala), Isaac Goldenberg (Peru), Ricardo Feierstein, Manuela Fingueret, Alicia Steinberg, Eliahu Toker, and Marcos Aguinis (Argentina) elaborate on “multiple exiles,” “zones of marginality,” “cultural mestizaje,” and “dual identities,” the latter being a more serious affliction than “dual loyalties” because it attacks one’s inner self. Samuel Rawet, Clarice Lispector, and Moacyr Scliar, each with a different response to their Jewish heritage, are all respected Brazilian writers. Scliar turned his Jewish protagonist into a centaur to express the ambiguous status of Jew as Brazilian and human being. These artists’ breadth of imagination, willingness to experiment with traditional genres, and creativity in inventing new ones have attracted a general readership while also revealing a profound insecurity; disillusionment is the hallmark of their work. And this very hispanic desengaño has won them public acceptance. Through fiction, poetry, and literary criticism (one thinks
of María Rosa Lidía, David Viñas, Daniel Muñnik) Jewish sensibilities and Jewish authors are winning a place in the Latin American literary canon.

Many Jewish immigrants turned to journalism as a profession, and a considerable number founded their own journals of opinion. The total number of periodicals emanating from identifiable Jewish sources that have circulated in Buenos Aires at one time or another probably comes to as many as 250. With the acculturation of the second generation and attrition of the communal press, journalists who are Jewish emerged into the wider, multimedia, Spanish- and Portuguese-language world. Bernardo Verbitsky of El Mundo, Antonio Portnoy of La Gaceta and others introduced a substantial presence of Jewish journalists into the Argentine press. The most famous of practicing journalists outside the country may be Jacobo Timerman of La Opinión; but equally provocative inside Argentina was the non-English-speaking Hernán Schiller, ousted editor of Nueva Presencia, who championed human rights during the worst days of the proceso. The current president of Argentine PEN is a Jew, and so is the first Latin American to be elected president of the Federation of International Association of Journalists.

We have already seen that Jews were among the pioneers of Argentine films: Aída Bortnik’s The Official Story dramatized the infamy of the proceso for non-Argentine audiences. Paloma Efron (“Blackie”) and a host of other entertainers achieved fame on the Argentine radio and stage despite their “exotic” origins. Participation by individuals of Jewish origin in the cultural life of Latin American societies, tentative at the start and largely confined to the world of Yiddish, accelerated in the years between the world wars, with the coming of age of a generation for whom Spanish and Portuguese were native languages. Actors occupy several pages in recent books about Jewish Argentina and Mexico. As writers and performers, Jews present in socially acceptable ways the tensions, humors, and aspirations they share with their audiences. They perform on club and concert circuits, compose tangos, and join the society for the preservation of lunfardo (the porteño dialect).

Dissemination abroad of works by these writers and artists is partly attributable to the fact of their emigrations and exiles. Exile sensibility is a major element in postmodern literature, and in this respect, Jews had a two-thousand-year head start. Emigration gave Latin American Jewish writers access to publishers and audiences beyond the Spanish-speaking world. One thinks of the Chilean Jewish social critic (The Empire’s Old Clothes) and dramatist (Death and the Maiden), Ariel Dorfman. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil have all suffered serious diminution of their intellectual and artistic capital as large numbers of talented men and women, Jews among them, were exiled or fled repression. Many were attracted to the United States, owing to its freer intellectual atmosphere, economic incentives, and the existence of New York as a major cultural center. Others, especially Sephardim, made new homes in Spain. The Asociación Internacional de Escritores Judíos en Lengua Española (International Association of Jewish Writers in Spanish and Portuguese Languages) is based in Israel and its principal literary journal, Noaḥ (Noah) is published.
from Jerusalem, replicating in an uncanny way the experience of fifteenth-century Sephardim, many of whose greatest achievements were accomplished beyond the borders of Spain in Egypt or Turkey.

Some performing artists find it necessary to quit their native lands for less dramatic reasons: to acquire the training they need, or in search of an international career. Bolivian Jaime Laredo, the Argentine composer Lalo Schifrin and the pianist and conductor Daniel Barenboim all made their reputations in the United States. Schifrin was born in Buenos Aires to Latino parents with roots in Russia. His father was concertmaster at Buenos Aires' Teatro Colón and his first piano teacher was Enrique Barenboim (father of Daniel). After studying with Olivier Messiaen, Schifrin formed a jazz band that attracted the attention of Dizzy Gillespie, who brought him to the United States in 1958. Daniel Barenboim, born in Buenos Aires in 1942, debuted in the United States in 1957 and went on to an international career. In 1996 he made a nostalgic trip down memory lane with a cassette of tangos titled "Mi Buenos Aires Querido." The title comes from a Carlos Gardel tango, which itself may owe something to a Yiddish song.

The underground survival of Jewish culture during periods of repression was demonstrated in 1983, when, within a month of the resignation of the military regime, Buenos Aires audiences were treated to a production of *The Diary of Anne Frank* and a recital of Mozart songs sung in Yiddish. The arena within which artists and intellectuals of Jewish origin may function—theatres, universities, art galleries, radio and television—has expanded dramatically in recent years, a fact worth noting because their success depends not only on talent but on their acceptability to the public.

The roster of Jewish scientists who have emerged from Latin cultures to play a role in the evolution of scientific knowledge is distinguished and should be the subject of a separate monograph. A not atypical life history is that of César Milstein, son of a Jewish farmer from Villaguay, Entre Ríos, and a Russian-born peddler who founded the first Yiddish school in Bahía Blanca. César graduated in biochemistry from the University of Buenos Aires, where he founded the first cooperative bookstore. His doctoral thesis was awarded a prize by the Argentine Society of Biochemists, and he went on to win a fellowship to study at Cambridge. Returning to Argentina to make his career, he became director of the Department of Molecular Biology at the National Institute of Microbiology. He resigned his position in 1963 because of turmoil in the institutions of higher learning. Thereafter, he returned to Cambridge. He was awarded a Nobel prize in medicine in 1984. He is just one of the hundreds of intellectuals who were lost to Argentina due to the brutalization of politics in that country.

The integration of Jews into Latin American societies is taking place in an amazing variety of ways. Jewish gauchos continue to exert their charm: in 1995, two Buenos Aires plays dealt with that vanished tribe. Countless colombianos wear a six-pointed Star of David on a chain around the neck as a
good luck charm. At another level, in 1992, Uruguay issued a postage stamp commemorating five hundred years of a Jewish presence in the Americas; the stamp was designed by Raquel Orsuj, daughter of the founder of a Yiddish-language daily. In a meaningful symbolic act, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori prepared for Efraín Goldenberg's swearing in as prime minister by removing the crucifix that usually presides over such ceremonies. In a cemetery in Manaus, Christians make pilgrimage to pray at the grave of Rabbi Saion Moyal, who died on the banks of the Amazon in 1910. The saint, it is said, miraculously confers health and fertility on those who pray here and leave a pebble on his tomb. Not all the mythology is unfavorable to Jews.

Reorienting Jewish Life

Events of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that the accommodation Jews had made to Latin American life—a secular minority attached to Zionism as a substitute for its ancestral religion—had reached its limit. The close relationship with the State of Israel, originally a source of pride, presented dangers as Zionism came under attack from the right (as a form of dual loyalty) and the left (Israel as an ally of imperialist powers). Originally, the Jewish state had enhanced the security of insecure immigrants. A generation down the road it was clear that Israel was driven by its own needs, not by the difficulties of Latin American diaspora communities. Mutual interest between Israel and Latin American Jewry could no longer be taken for granted. Most important, the original goal of Zionism had been achieved. Not only does the State of Israel exist, but it has emerged as a political force beyond the control of its supporters in the diaspora. Attention could now be turned to local problems.

The secular option had also played itself out. Secularism had been sufficient to sustain Jewish life among immigrants who carried their Judaism within them, for whom Zionism, memorializing the Holocaust, and campaigning for the release of Soviet Jews provided adequate spiritual sustenance. But secularism proved itself inadequate to the task of transmitting Judaism to succeeding generations who had never been exposed to the all-embracing Jewish life of the European, Asian, or African kehillot, and to whom the Holocaust seemed as distant as the Expulsion from Spain. Absence of a religious core to Jewish life came to be seen as a principal reason for the accelerating rate of intermarriage, which brought with it the prospect of disappearance of Judaism from the continent entirely. Furthermore, governments that repressed other aspects of Jewish life, such as Zionism or Bundism, had a record of respecting religion observance. Interest in Judaism as a religion increased as commitment to Zionism waned.

As noted earlier, Argentine synagogues, sports clubs, and cultural institutions all gained membership during the repressive military regime of 1976–8 as they were perceived to be safe havens. With the return of democracy, some parents feared that their children would bolt from their protective custod and return to the national political maelstrom, once more exposing themselves to danger. At this juncture, a species of religious revival began, influenced I
global as well as regional developments. Religious commitment is evidently increasing throughout the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish worlds. Within Judaism, the phenomenon of the baal t'shuva (one who returns to belief) has gained importance. Orthodox rabbis with a mission of outreach to the lost Jews of Latin America took up the challenge in the 1980s. Missionaries of Agudat Israel, as well as Lubavitcher and Satmar Hasidim were sent to principal cities all over Latin America; founding yeshivot (religious schools) to attract the sons of the unaffiliated. Rejecting efforts to modernize the ancient religion, Orthodoxy receives considerable financial and moral support from Jews who lack religious formation themselves but are now seeking their spiritual roots. It detracts nothing from their spiritual motivation to note that the choice of Orthodoxy sometimes originates in the desire to inoculate their children against assimilation and keep them out of reach of another round of rebellion and repression.

As described earlier, the Buenos Aires rabbinical seminary has prepared several classes of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking rabbis capable of presenting Judaism in a modern vernacular. Their Progressive congregations attract parents who may themselves be agnostic but who want to give their children a Jewish identity without entering into the Orthodox world. These congregations have acquired social status, as upwardly mobile families exchange their Yiddish-speaking schools and clubs for modernized religious congregations. By 1988, some fifty Conservative congregations were functioning in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico, thirty of these with Seminario-trained rabbis, and embracing about one hundred thousand congregants whose enthusiasm can achieve lyrical heights. Progressive rabbis also engage in dialogue with Catholic and Protestant clergy where such initiatives are possible, advancing into territory Orthodox Jews avoid. The dialogue is probably most advanced in Brazil; in Argentina, engagement with the church was foreclosed by the hierarchy's involvement with the military repression. Interfaith dialogue could begin only in the postdictatorship period of the 1980s, when it was jump-started by officials of the World Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League, and American Jewish Committee. Today, dialogue and the publishing of guidelines for activating the 1952 reforms of Vatican II proceed at a dignified pace. But the principal spokesmen for Jewish and Catholic rapprochement reside in the United States.

Possibly the most spectacular instance of a revival of religion among Jews is taking place in Cuba. Under the Revolution, creyentes—religious believers of any faith—were not accepted as members of the Communist party, and therefore could not be admitted to a university or a professional career. Even so, five synagogues survived in Havana, although most Jews abandoned the island and few of those remaining were interested in religion.

When the government's religious policy was relaxed by decision of the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist party in 1991, synagogues revived along with churches. As Cubans were relieved of the necessity of suppressing
their religious beliefs. Jewish life revived. There were still holes in its roof, but the Patronato de la Casa de la Comunidad Hebr�a de Cuba resumed functioning as a synagogue and community center. Leadership was assumed by a physician, Dr. Jos� Miller. Lubavitcher rabbis began visiting the country, bringing prayerbooks. Argentine youth groups visited, taught their songs and dances to local teenagers, and started a youth movement at the Patronato that drew from all the ethnic and religious congregations. Rabbi Shmuel Sztiehendler traveled to Havana monthly from Guadalajara, Mexico, in order to teach, perform marriages, and preside over brit milah (ritual circumcision), performed in a government hospital. In a community where by 1990 almost everyone married in the preceding thirty years had married a non-Jew, interest was now aroused in the conversion of non-Jewish spouses to Judaism. Rabbi Sztiehendler, a graduate of the Buenos Aires Seminario Rab�nico, was religiously prepared to carry out the conversions, and the tiny community of 809 almost doubled in size. In the drab days of the winding down of Communist society in 1994, while teenagers were leading a group in perfectly articulated Hebrew songs upstairs at the Patronato, downstairs a visitor chartered a Havana chapter of Hadassah. That none of the new members had ever before heard of the largest organization of Jewish women in the world was a measure of their isolation. The new chapter's first president was Dr. Susana Bleifisch, an Argentine who earned her medical degree at the University of Buenos Aires and taught otolaryngology there until 1966. That was the year General Onganfa assaulted the universities, provoking the brain drain that has afflicted Argentina ever since. When faculty were dragged from their offices and labs and beaten up on the street, Dr. Bleifisch transferred her knowledge and her family to Cuba.

Kehillot mirror the societies in which they operate. A closed regime cannot tolerate a democratic polity in its midst, and kehillot necessarily adopt the reigning political style. With the renewal of democracy throughout Latin America in the 1980s, opportunity was created for democratizing the kehillot. A new generation assumed leadership, reformed electoral procedures, and developed agendas relating to local needs as well as those of the State of Israel. Energetic young researchers turned their analytic sights on their own history, and books on Jewish subjects found publishers. Sponsorship of international conferences opened the windows of the Jewish world to global winds of change. Advertisements for events of Jewish interest were posted in public places for the first time, and Jews who ran for public office incurred less criticism for endangering the community. These changes could not have come about without the growth of tolerance in the body politic.

The alternation of anti-Semitic razzias during democratic periods with the repressions of militarized periods demonstrates the vulnerability of Jews to political and economic pressures. As a largely middle-class population living in polarized societies, Jews are inordinately affected by social dislocation. Those engaged with Jewish life may be somewhat shielded from repressive actions, but they are marginalized by societies that demand their total immersion in the non-Jewish milieu. Those who abjured Judaism and won acceptance
within liberal and progressive sectors find themselves defenseless against repression from the right. The experiences of the 1970s and 1980s ended the dream of integration into a secular society. The destruction of the AMIA, compounded by the impunity allowed the terrorists, brought into question the future of the largest of the Jewish communities of Latin America and underscored the need to rethink the strategy for Jewish survival in Latin America.

The ideal of a secular Latin American Jewish identity founded on the rock of racionalismo. In this situation, a turn to religion could be seen as a way of gaining acceptance as a tolerated minority. It was not the path originally chosen by the Ashkenazic immigrants; it is not the liberalizing solution sought by the immigrant generation. But it is close to the path historically followed by Sephardim, whose culture and whose survival skills were developed in a thousand years of living in hispanic societies. During the Columbus quincentenary year the governments of both Spain and Portugal abjured the anti-Semitism that led to persecution and expulsion of the Jews five hundred years ago. If the Latin American republics follow a similar path, religion could become a way to satisfy both the Jewish quest for survival and the proscriptions that these societies lay upon their nonconformists.
in possible violation of arms-export controls. In late November 1986, Reagan Administration officials announced that some of the proceeds from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran had been diverted to the Contras" (xiii). Investigation revealed that Israel had been one of the channels utilized by Reagan operatives under the control of Col. Oliver North to sell weapons to Iran in exchange for U.S. hostages, and to use profits from the sale to transmit weapons to the Nicaraguan Contras.


34. See reports and editorials in Christian Science Monitor, New York Times, Latin America Weekly Report, etc., throughout the year.

35. These and other insights are developed by Damián J. Fernández in his essay "Central America, the Middle East, and the Spiderweb Theory of Conflict," in Fernández, ed., Central America and the Middle East.


37. Ibid., p. 59.


41. The report of the delegation, sponsored by the now-defunct New Jewish Agenda, was circulated in mimeographed form. It was signed by, inter alia, Rabbi Marshall Meyer, who had established his human rights credentials by opposing the Argentine military junta. The report was debated in the pages of Moment 9, no. 9 (October 1984):12–24.


Chapter 11


4. Ibid., pp. 68–69.


6. Ibid., pp. 13–18.


9. Ibid., 91.


12. Haim Avni, in “Antisemitism in Argentina: The Dimensions of Danger,” pp. 62–63, asserts that “The affiliation of Jews with either organization (ERP and Montoneros) required the renunciation of Jewishness.” A similar statement by the present author in the first edition of this book aroused a passionate denial from a Jewish former member of the Montoneros who asserted that Jews were accepted on equal terms with non-Jews among leadership, middle echelon, and action cadres alike. My informant also claimed that Jewish radicals were effective within the Uruguayan Tupamaros despite the anti-Israel stance of that group.

13. Testimony of Laura Bonaparte de Bruschtein, from exile in Mexico. In Exigimos justicia porque queremos la paz, pp. 7–8.


17. The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, American Jewish Committee, and the World Jewish Congress all tracked these incidents. Reference may be made to their numerous publications for details.

18. See, inter alia, Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number; CONADEP, Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared; Carlos Gabetta, Todos somos subversivos; Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, various publications reproducing testimony of victims.


26. A moving memorial to the victims will be found in Eliahu Toker, Sus nombres y sus rostros: Album recordatorio de las víctimas del atentado del 18 de julio de 1994.

27. By way of example, here is Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado, on the first anniversary of the military takeover in Peru. “I want to repeat that not one of us has political ambitions. We are not interested in competing in the electoral arena. We have not come to play the game of politics . . . . Some people expected very different things and were confident, as had been the custom, that we came to power for the sole purpose of calling elections and returning to them all their privileges. The people who thought that way were and are mistaken.” Cited in Loveman and Davies, The Politics of Anti-Politics, p. 211.


29. Despite Chile’s international reputation as a democratic society, in the 1950s the country had the second highest infant mortality rate in the hemisphere, exceeded only by Haiti.

30. American Jewish Year Book 77:356.


35. Names and offices were reported in successive issues of World Jewish Congress Dateline and OJ1 (Buenos Aires).

36. A more detailed analysis is to be found in my essay “Is There a ‘Jewish Interest’ in Latin American Politics?”


38. Interview, Rabbi Angel Kreiman, at the time chief rabbi of Chile.


40. Edgardo Catterberg, “Argentina Survey.” Nineteen hundred individuals were interviewed face-to-face in their homes between 12 November and 3 December 1992.

41. The three most influential studies are Gino Germani’s class-based “Antisemitismo ideológico y antisemitismo tradicional,” Comentario 39 (1962); Enrique Pichon Rivière’s comparison of civilian with military opinion, “Los perjuicios raciales en Argentina,” in Nueva Sion for 31 January 1964; and Joaquín Fischerman’s “Etnocentrismo y antisemitismo,” Indice 1 (December 1967). All were reprinted in Sebreli, La cuestión judía en la Argentina.

42. Senkman, Impunity, p. 54.

43. See, for example, Lois Baer Barr, Isaac Unbound: Patriarchal Traditions in the Latin American Jewish Novel; Ana E. Weinstein and Miryam E. Gover de Nasatsky, eds., Escritores judeo-argentinos. Bibliografía 1900–1987; Ilan Stavans,


45. Biographic sketches of hundreds of Argentine Jewish personalities will be found in Feierstein, *Historia de los judíos argentinos*, and in Martha Wolff and Myrtha Schalom, eds., *Judios y argentinos. judíos argentinos*. For Mexico, see Judit Bokser de Liwerant, *Imágenes de un encuentro: La presencia judía en México durante la primera mitad del siglo XX.*


47. Ibid., *Judíos & Argentinos*, p. 246.

48. Research into the practice of Judaism in Latin America is almost nonexistent. A rabbinic thesis on “The Emergence of the Progressive Judaism in South America” was submitted to Hebrew Union College by Clifford Kulwin in 1983.


50. Rabbi Leon Klenicki (Anti-Defamation League) and Eugene J. Fisher (National Conference of Catholic Bishops) have jointly published instructional materials in Spanish for putting into practice the principles of *Nostra Aetate*, the 1982 document in which the Second Vatican Council spelled out the spiritual bonds between the church and the Jewish people.

51. In 1991 the number of persons registered to receive matzo at Passover was 809.